This third podcast in the series by the Center for Intra-Muslim Studies (CIMS) features Dr Muhammed Reza Tajri and a panel of scholars discussing how to address abuse in Muslim communities. The panel discuss the complexities of balancing the need to confront abuse with concerns about fueling Islamophobia. They explore various forms of abuse, such as spiritual and sexual abuse, and the power dynamics that contribute to them. The discussion highlights the importance of implementing safeguards, developing community-based justice systems, and exploring restorative justice approaches. The panelists also stress the need for accountability among religious leaders and suggest practical steps for communities to prevent abuse.

The Centre for Intra-Muslim Studies (CIMS) was established in 2015 to bring together Muslims from across the denominational spectrum to critically discuss ideas pertaining to Islamic theology, history, and contemporary issues affecting Muslims.

Whether or not non-Muslims are subject to Sharīʿa responsibilities has been treated in various contexts in works of uṣul al-fiqh and fiqh. Across schools of thought the prevalent view has been that non-Muslim are indeed subject to sharia responsibilities before God. This position is endorsed by Imāmī Shīʿa legal theorists such as Sharīf alMurtaḍā (d. 436/1044), Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), and ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 460/1067). Each of these considered the question within the context of the linguistic discussions of uṣul al-fiqh framed within enquiries regarding the scope of the imperative. Does the imperative include the non-Muslim and the slave as it includes the Muslim and the free person? This paper will examine how this position has been nuanced by some modern Shīʿī Uṣūlī’s, in response to an Akhbārī rejections of the prevalent view, by distinguishing between universal moral responsibilities applicable to all and particular Sharīʿa addresses only incumbent upon believers. The paper will further point to some contemporary implications of this distinction for our understanding of the nature and practice of Sharīʿa in plural contexts.

The main question addressed in this paper is: “Can jurists rely on moral judgments to disregard or qualify scriptural evidence?” The standard answer to this question among later uṣūlī scholars is yes, provided that the moral judgment in question is “conclusive”. Otherwise, the scriptural evidence will retain its validity. In applying this principle to particular cases, such as child marriage, jurists working within this paradigm split into two groups: a minority who claim that the moral judgment in question is certain, and accordingly modify or set aside the conflicting scriptural evidence; and a majority who believe that the moral judgment in question is not certain, and consequently resolve the conflict in favour of scriptural evidence. Regarding the level of justification one can legitimately claim for moral judgments, the second group are correct in most cases. Therefore, granting the dominant paradigm, the path of moral reforms in jurisprudence is effectively closed. However, one can ask whether such a stringent condition as certainty for the permissibility of using moral judgments in jurisprudential arguments is rationally defensible. In this paper, I try to show that such a condition is indefensible, and hence the dominant paradigm lacks rational credibility. Based on the alternative paradigm that I propose and defend, the conflict we face here is of an epistemological and hermeneutical nature. Thus, the appropriate solution to this conflict is to weigh the evidence we have in favour of moral judgments against conflicting scriptural evidence and prioritise the stronger, i.e., the evidence with a higher probability of being true. Within this paradigm, for moral judgments to take precedence over opposing scriptural evidence, it is sufficient that the moral judgment has stronger rational support by virtue of being more probable than the conflicting scriptural evidence. This paradigm provides a rational basis for moral reforms in jurisprudence.